Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers
Volume 26

Issue 1

Article 10

1-1-2009

T. L. S. Sprigge, THE GOD OF METAPHYSICS: BEING A STUDY OF
THE METAPHYSICS AND RELIGIOUS DOCTRINES OF SPINOZA,
HEGEL, KIERKEGAARD, T.H. GREEN, BERNARD BOSANQUET,
JOSIAH ROYCE, A.N. WHITEHEAD, CHARLES HARTSHORNE, AND
CONCLUDING WITH A DEFENCE OF PANTHEISTIC IDEALISM
William Lad Sessions

Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy

Recommended Citation
Sessions, William Lad (2009) "T. L. S. Sprigge, THE GOD OF METAPHYSICS: BEING A STUDY OF THE
METAPHYSICS AND RELIGIOUS DOCTRINES OF SPINOZA, HEGEL, KIERKEGAARD, T.H. GREEN, BERNARD
BOSANQUET, JOSIAH ROYCE, A.N. WHITEHEAD, CHARLES HARTSHORNE, AND CONCLUDING WITH A
DEFENCE OF PANTHEISTIC IDEALISM," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers: Vol. 26 : Iss. 1 , Article 10.
DOI: 10.5840/faithphil200926110
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol26/iss1/10

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and
creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange.

108

Faith and Philosophy

than being thrust on us by transcendent facts together with our epistemic
limits. In sum, it is not clear that the mysterian response to my inconsistent
triad above fares better than the other two. Would a stronger doctrine of
divine incomprehensibility be worth the price?
This book deserves to be widely read by students of theology, philosophy
of religion, and apologetics. It is nicely written, organized, and presented,
and features a good index, and only very few (insignificant) typographical
errors. It would provide ideal material for graduate level seminars in any
of the aforementioned fields. Some readers will, like this reviewer, take this
book to suggest that the mysterian defense of Christian belief is a philo
sophical dead end, while others will take it as presenting an exciting, wellmotivated, and genuinely different apologetic option. Either way, there's
apt material for reflection here, whether one is trying to come up with a
defeater-defeater-defeater, or trying to shore up the mysterian defenses.

The God of Metaphysics: Being a Study of the Metaphysics and Religious Doctrines
of Spinoza, Hegel, Kierkegaard, T. H. Green, Bernard Bosanquet, Josiah Royce,
A. N. Whitehead, Charles Hartshorne, and Concluding with a Defence of Pantheistic
Idealism, by T. L. S. Sprigge. Oxford University Press, 2006. Pp. 576. $99.00.
WILLIAM LAD SESSIONS, Washington and Lee University
This is an old-fashioned book, in many ways, and not just in its massive
subtitle. Its subject, point of view, and position are all unfashionable, to be
sure. But it is out of joint with the philosophical times in many other ways:
it is a very long monograph in an era of journal pieces and books that are
little more than collections of those pieces (Professor Sprigge confesses
that he "is not a great reader of philosophical articles . . . just as I avoid
reading short stories. Neither of these forms allows one to immerse one
self in another's world, but acts only so as to jerk one out of one's own."
[p. viii]); its style is leisurely and discursive, eschewing precise formaliza
tion even when presenting complex arguments; its idioms are often from
another era; its masculine pronouns are politically incorrect; it lavishes
attention on philosophers mostly ignored or forgotten today (Green, Bo
sanquet, Royce); and it takes seriously views rarely considered, much less
defended in public anymore. In this Age of Naturalism, Professor Sprigge
is a resolute defender of Absolute Idealism, something many believe ex
pired in the nineteenth century. "Personally," he says, "I see no more rea
son why a nineteenth-century thinker might not be right as against what
seems undeniable common sense today" (p. 111).
I confess to having enjoyed reading this weighty tome, in daily mod
eration. It has much to interest an open-minded contemporary reader. I
would divide the book into three basic parts (versus Sprigge's ten chap
ters). First, Sprigge sketches the problematical relation of the God of the
metaphysicians to the God of religion, asking both whether a notion of
God metaphysically derived overlaps or is congruent with religious con
ceptions of God and also whether a metaphysical God can serve religious
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functions for some—if not whole communities then in personal lives. This
is done chiefly in the brief opening and concluding chapters, though there
are short sections in most other chapters devoted to this topic. Second,
he explores in rich detail the systematic views of seven metaphysicians—
those listed in the epic subtitle to his book—as well as one influential critic
of metaphysics (Kierkegaard's Johannes Climacus). Each is given a long
chapter (as many as 75 pages), and Sprigge seeks to present their whole
metaphysical systems, not merely their views of God, as well as bits of
their lives and times, with side excursions to all sorts of historical and con
temporary issues. Finally, Sprigge spends 50 pages developing his own
version of Idealism, which he calls "Pantheistic Idealism" (chap. 9). I shall
comment briefly on each of these three parts.
1. Tertullian may have been the first, but he certainly is not the only
thinker to ask what Athens has to do with Jerusalem. Climacus/Kierkeg
aard's worries about inwardness and concrete existence untouched by
the abstract and bloodless ballet of metaphysical categories only partly
measures the distance. Sprigge nonetheless thinks that metaphysicallydriven concepts of God, at least from Idealistic sources, can be religiously
relevant and helpful. First, he is properly aware that there are very many
concepts that might well be labeled "God," and he helpfully provides
a list of fourteen conditions such as "creator," "uniquely all-knowing,"
"uniquely all-experiencing," and so on (p. 8): the more conditions met
by an entity within a metaphysical system, and if there is nothing within
the system that satisfies more of these conditions, the closer the concep
tion of that entity is to a conception of God. Still, what's the religious value
of such a metaphysical conception? Sprigge provides another list of the
"things which religion is thought to do for people," such as providing "a
degree of comfort when the world looks bleak" (p. 11), and argues that
the metaphysical gods he considers may provide some religious value to
at least some individuals, though they will probably not satisfy many, if
any, religious communities. That conclusion does not in the least discomfit
Sprigge, an independent-minded Unitarian.
But the issues of a religious versus a metaphysical God are consider
ably broader than Sprigge believes. Any metaphysics, as a comprehensive
coherent picture of ultimate reality, must say something about something
approximating God, even if to declare there is not or could not be such
a thing. Sprigge is interested in metaphysical views that not only permit
but require some approximate conception of God. In his view, the only
eligible kinds of metaphysics are idealistic ones; materialist or naturalist
views will be unable to account for values and consciousness (these are in
timately related for Sprigge, an ethical hedonist). But this contention of his
large book is under-argued, and naturalists will be undaunted. Certainly
Sprigge is right to maintain that idealist metaphysical systems seem more
comforting to (at least some liberal) theists, but he sells short the possibili
ties of a supernaturalism fully compatible with a materialistic naturalism
or a religious naturalism without supernaturalism.
2. There is no room here to go into detail about all of the chapters in
which Sprigge treats his eight major philosophers; each essay displays his
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close and thoughtful reading of a major figure, and generalists as well as
specialists will profit—the former by being introduced to thinkers whose
ideas are unfamiliar to them, the latter by reading interpretations worth
considering. To illustrate, I choose his discussion of Whitehead and Hartshorne in chapter eight. He says he is sympathetic to process philosophy's
"panpsychism and approximation at least to the notion of the specious
present," which encourages the view that "unexperienced reality is im
possible" (p. 469). But he disagrees on three fundamental issues: the meta
physical glue of the universe, the nature of time, and the problem of evil.
On the first point, he thinks divine prehension is insufficient for belonging
to "a cosmic mind or experience," on the second he holds that the future
is just as "absolutely determinate" as the past (pp. 469-470), and on the
third he thinks evil is only phenomenal, unreal from the standpoint of the
Absolute. Arguably he misunderstands process thought on all counts.
First, physical prehension is no mere abstraction but a concrete rela
tion, whereby one actual entity includes another actual entity, save for its
subjective immediacy, and incorporates that second actuality into the first:
what more could a cosmic mind desire to experience that it is possible to
experience? Sprigge prefers a cosmic mind that somehow includes even
the subjectivity of others. But then on a process view he thereby removes
the others' independent existence—they no longer instance creativity
themselves but are finally only subordinate and derivative parts of the
one eternal Absolute.
This brings us to the second, and I suspect deeper, disagreement.
Sprigge thinks that a denial of a determinate future is "both incredible
and upsetting" (p. 470), believing that without an eternal determinate
truth there is no fact of the matter to anything in time, whether past, pres
ent or future. Thus, "Time as ordinarily conceived is unreal" (p. 493).
Process philosophers will find Sprigge's position equally incredible and
upsetting. If everything were eternally determinate, the transition from
future to past via the present would be nothing more than a metaphysical
illusion, however stubborn, as would our sense of agency, freedom, and
creativity. Whether this deep conflict of intuitions can be adjudicated is
doubtful, and Sprigge's argument from the timelessness of truth to the
eternality of all truth is unconvincing.
On the third point, he thinks there is a "facile optimism about the world"
in process philosophy's attitude toward the bad and evil in the world (p.
458). The process God is a "sensitive parent" of all beings, providing con
solation to them by suffering along with their sufferings and encouraging
greater goodness universally. Sprigge's form of idealism can offer no such
consolation: everything that has happened, is happening and will happen
must happen, and if we do not see the goodness in it (which for Sprigge,
involves taking pleasure in experiencing it), then all we can do is to try
to take the wider cosmic view and console ourselves with the thought
that somehow it is all necessary and good for the absolute whole—even
our suffering, striving and confusion. A process philosopher would think
Sprigge evades or denies the problem of evil, not solves it.
3.
Sprigge admires all the Idealists he considers in this volume, but his
own version combines the panpsychism of Whitehead and Hartshorne
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(every genuinely real entity is at least minimally an experiencer) with the
absolutism of F. H. Bradley (everything real is experienced by one abso
lute being)—what he calls "Pantheistic Idealism." He believes it "serves
the cause of religion in the best sense" (p. 473). For him, any metaphysics
seeks "absolute truth about the nature of reality," and he wants this ab
solute truth "made peculiarly perspicuous to him," which in turn means
being able to "imagine" it (p. 476). Sprigge says he cannot imagine the
unexperienced—it will always turn out to be part of a wider whole that is
an experience. Thus concrete reality (as distinct from the abstractions of
science) "consists of innumerable streams of experience interacting with
each other," and all are included, eternally, "within a single absolute all
embracing experience or consciousness" (pp. 483-486). This eternal "all
embracing consciousness" Sprigge calls "God," though he admits there
might be some dispute about the matter (p. 487). But he insists there is
religious value in this view, whether or not it is orthodoxly Christian (he
believes it does support "Jesus's two great commandments"); it has at
least personal if not communal religious value, "[f]or it reassures us that
somehow reality is not so fleeting or so bad as it often seems" (p. 529),
though I am not clear how reassuring it is to be told that what is fleeting
or bad is unreal.
No space remains for criticism, but only for a word of encouragement to
potential readers. Those members of traditional theistic communities who
believe in a personal God who is active in human history and who answers
petitionary prayers may find Sprigge's "eternal consciousness" remote
and inert. Those who consider time to be not illusory but the key to reality
may find Sprigge's eternalism problematic, though they may warm to his
panexperientialism. Those pursuing some au courant program of toughminded naturalism will probably just ignore this book. All, however, could
learn from this wise and learned philosopher. "The serious thinker will at
tend to all arguments which have been put forward by figures of any intel
lectual pretensions and accept or dismiss them independently of how far
their conclusions fit the mood of any particular time" (p. 224). Sprigge is a
serious thinker, no matter what the current mood, and he deserves wider
attention than he is likely to get.

Religions, Reasons and Gods: Essays in Cross-Cultural Philosophy o f Religion,
by John Clayton, prepared for publication by Anne M. Blackburn and
Thomas D. Carroll. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Pp. vii
+372 . $100 (hardback).
NANCY FRANKENBERRY, Dartmouth College
Cross-cultural philosophy of religion is honored more often by expecta
tion than by execution. In this book we find both great expectations (for
what John Clayton hoped to finish before his untimely death) and ratio
nal execution (based largely on the text of Clayton's Stanton Lectures).
Indeed, the very reasonableness of the essays and chapters assembled

